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EVIDENCE
ADMISSmILITY OF SCIENTIFC EVIDENCE:
VOICE SPECTROGRAPHY
N STATE V. WILLIAMS' the Ohio Supreme Court addressed for the first time
the issue of admissibility of voice analysis as indentification evidence.'
The court ruled that expert testimony and exhibits based on voice spectrography
analysis are admissible if they are relevant and will assist the trier of fact. 3
Williams also pronounces how Ohio courts should evaluate the admissibility
of scientific evidence.
The admissibility of identification evidence based upon spectrographic voice
analysis varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Voice spectrography is premised
on the scientific assumption that no two human voices are alike.' Developed
specifically to record voices,6 the spectrograph is an electromagnetic instru-
ment which analyzes sound and disperses it onto paper in graphic array of time.
frequency, and intensity.7 This picture of the voice's components is called a
spectrogram, or voiceprint.' The spectrograph operator compares a known voice
'4 Ohio St. 3d 53, 446 N.E.2d 444 (1983).
'By means of voice spectrography, an expert compares a known voice (defendant's) with an unknown
voice, the latter having been somehow recorded during, or in relation to, a crime. See infra notes 5-10
and accompanying text.
'4 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 446 N.E.2d at 447.
4See, e.g., United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975)(admissible);
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979)(admissible);
People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144 (1976)(not admissible); State v. Williams,
388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978)(admissible); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978)(not admissible);
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975)(admissible); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich.
141, 257 N.W.2d 537 (1977)(not admissible).
'Human speech occurs through a complex combination of physiological and mechanical characteristics
which typically stabilize after puberty. Giansiracusa, Voiceprints in the Courtroom - Scientic and Eviden-
tiary Problems, 21 ARIz. L. REV. 1163, 1164 (1979). For an excellent discussion of the hows, whys and
uses of voice spectrography see 0. Tosi, VoICE IDENTIFICATION, THEORY AND LEOAL AAPPLICATIONS (1979).
Evidentiary application of each voice's uniqueness is not limited to spectrography. For example, the Federal
Rules of Evidence allow a lay witness to testify as to the identity of an unknown speaker, by the sound
of his voice. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(5). Similarly, the law recognizes the uniqueness of the human body in
other types of evidence, i.e. fingerprints, hair samples, and blood samples, See Comment, Voice Spec-
trogram Analysis: A Case of False Elimination, 1980 ARiz. ST. L.J. 217, 220-21 (1980).
'4 Ohio St. 3d at 55, 446 N.E.2d at 445. Lawrence Kersta is the pioneer of voice identification by means
of voice spectrography. E. BLACK, VOICEPRINTING (1975).
'The spectrogram has a horizontal axis which indicates time lapse, and a vertical axis which indicates fre-
quency. The thickness of the lines represents voice intensity. State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500, 501 n.1
(Me. 1978). Mechanics of spectrography are discussed in A. MOENSSENS, R. MOSES, & F. INBAU, SCIEN-
TIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 507-23 (1973).
14 Ohio St. 3d at 55, 446 N.E.2d at 445. One court notes that the term "voiceprint" should be avoided
as "potentially leading to an unwarranted association with fingerprint evidence." United States v. Williams,
583 F.2d 1194, 1197 n.5 (2d Cit. 1978).
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with an unknown voice by pairing spectrograms of similar words and phrases
from each voice to determine whether they were uttered by the same speaker.9
Considering such variables as the comparative quality of the two tapes and
the number of sample words, the operator then concludes that the taped voices
are: 1) identical; 2) different; 3) probably identical; 4) probably different; or
5) impossible to identify. 10 In terms of courtroom testimony, the spectrograph
operator is an expert witness.
In Williams, the perpetrator of an aggravated robbery and felonious assault
forced his way into his victim's home by claiming that he had to call an am-
bulance. He made the call, requesting that an ambulance be sent to a false
address, and then he beat and robbed his victim. An ambulance service recorded
the call at the time of the assault. A few days later, the victim identified the
defendant, Mose Williams, from a photo array. The police arranged for
Williams to telephone the ambulance service and make the same statement as
the intruder had made from the victim's home."I The ambulance service tape
recorded this second call in the same manner as the first call.
The police sent the two tapes to Lt. Smrkovski, Commander of the
Michigan State Police Voice Identification Division.' 2 Smrkovski testified that
the two voices were "one and the same."'I3 In addition, the trial court admit-
ted into evidence the tapes, the voice spectrograms prepared by Smrkovski,
and testimony of another expert witness, who testified about the history and
use of voice spectrography.'I The jury convicted Wiliams, who appealed the
admission of the voice identification evidence. The court of appeals affirmed.'I
The Ohio Supreme Court agreed, utilizing Williams as an opportunity to declare
the standard under which Ohio courts should determine the admissibility of
spectrographic voice identification and similar scientific evidence.
In reaching its decision the Ohio Supreme Court examined three analytic
models for assessing admissibility of scientific evidence: a) the "general accep-
"'For an effective analysis, there must exist a sufficient number of words or phrases common to both
tapes such that a valid comparison may be made." Gansiracusa, supra note 5, at 1166. Typical cue words
which are selected for comparison are: "the, " "to, " "and, " "me," "on, "" "is," "'you, "' "'1, " "a,"" and
"it." If whole words are not available for comparison, parts of words, vowels, or consonants common
to both tapes are used. Williams 583 F.2d at 1197; Giansiracusa, supra note 5, at 1166.
Williams, 583 F.2d at 1199.
"4 Ohio St. 3d at 54, 446 N.E.2d at 445. For a description of how calls are generally recorded, see Tosi,
supra note 5, at 108-11.
"The Michigan department is well-known and long-established in forensic voice spectrograph. Lt. Smrkovski
joined the Identification Unit of the Michigan Department of State Police in 1971. He was trained by
Kersta (supra note 6) and received a Bachelor's Degree in Audiology and Speech Sciences in 1975, 0.
Tosi, supra note 5, at 140.
"4 Ohio St. 3d at 59, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
"This second expert was Dr. Henry Truby. Dr. Truby presented a paper on the application of voiceprint
analysis to speaker individuation at the Second International Conference of Crime Countermeasures, Sciences
and Engineering, Oxford, England, July 22-29, 1977. 0. Tosi, supra note 5, at 176.
'4 Ohio St. 3d at 55, 446 N.E.2d at 445.
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:4
2
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 4, Art. 12
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss4/12
STUDENT PROJECT: EVIDENCE
tance" standard;" b) the "reliability" standard; 7 and c) the McCormick stan-
dard as promulgated in the Rules of Evidence.' 8 The court first considered the
"general acceptance" standard set forth in Frye v. United States.'9 Frye re-
quires a showing that the scientific method and principles at issue are "suffi-
ciently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field." 20
The Frye test is difficult to employ because it necessitates a courtroom survey
of "the subjective views of a number of scientists, assuring thereby a reserve
of experts available to testify." 2' For example, where spectrographic evidence
is in issue, application of Frye encompasses a survey of experts in speech and
hearing and related fields as well as those experts who actually work with the
voice spectrograph.22
While this interpretation of Frye's "general acceptance" language may
be instructive for a new scientific method, a less exhaustive approach suffices
where the method has gained some measure of credibility. Nearly eight years
before the Ohio Supreme Courts decision in Williams, an Ohio Court of ap-
peals held that the Frye standard did not preclude admissibility of voice spec-
trograms because of "the growing weight of authority [of other jurisdictions]
finding no inhibition to the admission of recorded voice exemplars,. . . cor-
roborated by expert witnessess." 23 In Williams the Ohio Supreme Court ex-
pressly rejected the Frye analysis in application to spectrographic evidence,"
noting Professor McCormick's criticism of Frye:
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial
notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scien-
tific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified
expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for ex-
164 Ohio St. 3d at 56-57, 446 N.E.2d at 446.
"Id. at 57, 446 N.E.2d at 447.
"Id.
"1293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923).
"Id. at 1014.
21 Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. Giansiracusa points out that a modification of Frye really serves as a separate
standard of admissibility. This standard "is satisfied if the scienific technique is generally accepted by
those scientists who would be expected to be familiar with its use," thus excluding a survey of those speech
and audiology experts who do not use the spectrograph. Giansiracusa, supra note 5, at 1177 (citing Peo-
ple v. Williams, 164 Cal. App. 2d 858, 331 P.2d 251 (1958))(bloodtest); and Commonwealth v. Lykus,
367 Mass. 191, 204, 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975)(voice spectrography).
"Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978)(spectrographic evidence not admissible under
Frye). See also Note, Voice Identification Testimony Based On Spectrographic Analysis Inadmissible Because
the Technique Has Not Gained General Acceptance in the Scientifc Community - Reed v. State, 39 MD.
L. REV. 629 (1980).
"State v. Olderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975). The court relied principally upon
Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 327 N.E.2d 671 (1975), which held that spectrographic evidence
met Frye's general acceptance standard. However, see supra note 21.
The Olderman court also ruled that compelling a defendant to submit his voice to spectrographic
analysis did not violate his Constitutional rights. The court stated that giving a voice sample for iden-
tification purposes was not testimonial in character, nor did a person have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the sound of his voice. 44 Ohio App. 2d at 134-36, 336 N.E.2d at 447.
244 Ohio St. 3d at 57, 446 N.E.2d at 447.
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clusion. Particularly, probative value may be overborne by the familiar
dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and undue consumption
of time.2
Considering this accord with McCormick, it is not surprising that the court
also declined the second analytic model, set forth in United States v. Franks. 26
Franks requires that the scientific process be "relevant and reliable" to be ad-
missible. "Relevant and reliable" means that the proponent must establish that
spectrographic analysis (or other scientific process) is sufficiently accurate to
be meaningful in the forensic process. In Franks the expert voiceprint witness
was qualified "only after an extensive 25-page inquiry into his qualifications
and the reliability of the scientific process."I 7 This "reliability standard" allows
the trial judge wide discretion in evaluating the evidence without necessitating
the broad scientific survey required by the Frye test. Nevertheless, the Franks
approach does not differ very much from Frye as a practical matter. Under
either approach the court is constrained to put the scientific process itself on
trial before addressing how it relates to the specific case at hand. Finally, this
type of "reliability" inquiry arguably goes to the weight of the evidence, as
opposed to the sole question of relevance. Since weighing the evidence is the
proper province of the jury, it is not a requisite function in determining
admissibility. "8
The court declined to adopt either the Frye or the Franks test because to
do so would require a trial judge to extensively inquire into the scientific pro-
cess involved in all cases. Instead, the court adopted a third, more flexible ap-
proach to spectrographic evidence. This approach is consonant with McCor-
mick's viewpoint, and is to be applied on a case-by-case basis.2" The court stated:
[W]e refuse to engage in scientific nosecounting for the purpose of deciding
whether evidence based on newly ascertained or applied scientific prin-
ciples is admissible. We believe the Rules of Evidence establish adequate
preconditions for admissibility of expert testimony, and we leave to the
discretion of this state's judiciary, on a case by case basis, to decide whether
the questioned testimony is relevant and will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. 30
The threshhold inquiry under this standard is relevance. Evidence Rule 402
provides:
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States, by the Constitution of the State of Ohio,
"(MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 203 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1972).
26511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042 (1975).
"Id. at 33.
"See Williams, 388 A.2d at 505; Franks, 511 F.2d at 34.
24 Ohio St. 3d at 57-58, 446 N.E.2d at 447. The court's holding parallels Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978).
3'4 Ohio St. 3d at 58, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
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by statute enacted by the General Assembly not in conflict with a rule
of the Supreme Court of Ohio, by these rules, or by other rules prescrib-
ed by the Supreme Court of Ohio. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. 3'
Relevant expert testimony is admissible if it meets the standard in Evidence
Rule 702, which provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.32
Together, the two rules provide a basis for evaluating proffered spectrographic
evidence. If the voice identification is relevant, and if the witness qualifies as
an expert under Evidence Rule 702, and the identification will assist the trier
of fact, then the evidence will be admissible. However, as McCormick points
out,33 the evidence could be excluded on other grounds, such as prejudice,
misleading the jury, or other bases under Evidence Rule 403.1"
Even when the evidence is admitted under the Rules of Evidence the jury
is not bound by it, a further safeguard against "unreliable" evidence. Accor-
ding to the Williams court, the jury's control of the evidence, under proper
jury instructions,35 puts the controversy in its proper perspective:
We emphasize, however, that once the court determines admissibility, the
jury remains at liberty to reject voice identification evidence for any number
of reasons, including a view that spectrographic voice identification tech-
nique itself is either unreliable or misleading. We approve of the introduc-
tion, as here, of the original tapes used by Lt. Smrkovski, and the play-
ing of the tapes for the jury, so they could hear for the voice(s) at issue. 36
Based on this language, it is probably not enough for a voice spectrograph
expert to testify as to his conclusions, accompanied by a verbal description
of his technique. An offer of spectrographic evidence should include the tapes
and spectrograms themselves. Nor does Williams suggest that the proponent
of the evidence may omit proper evidentiary foundations. The witness must
be properly qualifed as an expert in voice spectrography. The opponent may
introduce testimony which rebuts the reliability of the evidence by challenging
the correctness of the scientific or forensic procedures used or the credibility
of the spectrographer as an expert.37
"fOHIO R. EVID. 402.
"1OHIo R. EVID. 702.
"See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
"OHIO R. EVID. 403.
"See 4 Ohio St. 3d at 59 n.7, 446 N.E.2d at 448 n.7 for the jury instructions used by the trial court.
"Id. at 59, 446 N.E.2d at 448.
37Id.
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The court's bypass of the Franks reliability standard should not be con-
fused with the indicia of reliability required to establish relevance. Williams
does not say that the court should admit unreliable evidence. Williams does,
however, remove the burden of a Frye or Franks type of requirement from
the trial judge's inquiry. No rigid test beyond the evidence rules themselves
need constrain the trial court's discretion as to admissibility. In applying its
402/702 standard to the evidence in Williams, the court said: "There was suf-
ficient demonstration of 'reliability' adduced at trial to qualify the evidence
as 'relevant' within the meaning of Evid. R. 402, and to qualify L.Smrkovski
as an expert witness as provided in Evid. R. 702."Il For scientific evidence
to be relevant there must be "some demonstration that it is sufficiently reliable
to make the existence or non-existence of a fact more probable than without
the evidence." 9
While clearly the test for voiceprints, the Williams standard of admissibility
does not apply to polygraph evidence. In a footnote to Williams, the court
declared that nothing in Williams "should be construed to weaken in any way
the continued vitality"'4 0 of its holding in State v. Souel.A Souel carefully set
forth the conditions for admissibility of polygraphic examination; it may be
admitted for purposes of corroboration or impeachment, providing that cer-
tain specific conditions are observed. 2 In any case, polygraph evidence may
be distinguished from the type of scientific evidence typified by spectrographic
voice analysis. Use of the polygraph purports to establish the honesty or credibili-
ty of a person, a process which coincides squarely with the function of the
jury. The conclusions of a polygraph expert may usurp the independence of
the jury,43 and are therefore dangerous on grounds not directly related to the
reliability of the polygraph as a scientific method. By contrast, evidence such
as the voiceprint, which relates only to identification, does not by itself "in-
dicate with any degree of conclusiveness that the defendant... so identified...
actually committed the crime."4
At the very least, the Williams standard should be applicable not only to
spectrographic voice identification, but to other types of objective scientific
methods which also aid in identification. Support for this proposition is found
in Owens v. Bell,45 in which the Ohio Supreme Court applied Williams to the
admissibility of human leukocyte antigen (HLA) tests to establish the probability
38Id.
"Note, supra Note 22 at 637; OHIo R. EVID. 401.
4'4 Ohio St. 3d at 56 n.4, 446 N.E.2d at 446 n.4.
'53 Ohio St. 2d 123, 372 N.E.2d 1318 (1978).
"2Id.
"3Comment, supra note 5, at 227.
"United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 169 (8th Cir. 1975).
"6 Ohio St. 3d 46, 451 N.E.2d 241 (1983).
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of paternity. First finding that the HLA tests would not be contrary to statute,46
the court then held the tests to be relevant and admissible under the Ohio Rules
of Evidence as set forth in Williams."' Thus, by its own authority, the Ohio
Supreme Court intends Williams to be applied to other objective scientific
methods.
LINDA C. ASHAR
"4Id. at 51, 451 N.E.2d at 242. The statutes in question were OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3111.09, 3111.10,
3111.16 and 2317.47 (Page 1980) relating to the use of blood grouping tests in determining who is not
the natural father of a child. HLA is not a blood grouping test, but is based upon tissue typing of the
white blood cells. In this case the HLA test results indicated a 98.4 percent probability that the appellee
was the father. Id. at 46, 451 N.E.2d at 241-42.
4Owens, 451 N.E.2d at 245. The court quoted directly from Williams.
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